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THE COURIER CONUNDRUM: 
THE HIGH COSTS OF PROSECUTING 
LOW-LEVEL DRUG COURIERS AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM 
Adam B. Weber* 
 
Since the United States declared its “War on Drugs,” federal enforcement 
of drug-trafficking crimes has led to increased incarceration and longer 
prison sentences.  Many low-level drug couriers and drug mules have 
suffered disproportionately from these policies; they face mandatory 
punishments that vastly exceed their culpability.  Drug couriers often lack 
substantial ties to drug-trafficking organizations, which generally recruit 
vulnerable individuals to act as couriers and mules.  By using either threats 
of violence or promises of relatively small sums of money, these 
organizations convince recruits to overlook the substantial risks that drug 
couriers face. 
The current policies of pursuing harsh punishments for low-level couriers 
generate significant societal costs.  These costs include not only monetary 
costs but also collateral damage imposed on both the couriers and innocent 
third parties.  Further, these harsh policies fail to generate appreciable 
benefits or satisfy the goals of either retributive or utilitarian theories of 
punishment.  This Note proposes a legislative amendment to the current 
importation statute that would create a carveout under which low-level drug 
couriers could be charged under a separate misdemeanor statute.  The 
proposal lays out a number of criteria that drafters could use to identify low-
level participants and exempt them from the stiff mandatory minimum 
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INTRODUCTION 
Laws are spiders’ webs through which the big flies pass and in which the 
little ones are caught. 
—Honoré dè Balzac1 
On May 24, 2016, Chevelle Nesbeth entered the federal courthouse in 
Brooklyn, New York, prepared to be sentenced to anywhere from thirty-three 
to forty-one months in prison.2  What she encountered, however, was mercy.  
District Judge Frederic Block sentenced Nesbeth to one year of probation and 
no prison time.3 
About a year earlier, Nesbeth was arrested at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport for attempting to smuggle 600 grams of cocaine in her 
suitcases.4  Thousands of low-level drug couriers are sentenced to prison each 
year,5 many with stories like Nesbeth’s.  At the time of her arrest, Nesbeth 
was nineteen years old, living with her mother, and working to pay her way 
through college.6  Nesbeth had never had any trouble with the law until her 
 
 1. HONORÉ DÈ BALZAC, THE HOUSE OF NUCINGEN 106 (William Walton trans., 1896). 
 2. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  Normally, 
Nesbeth would have been subject to the five-year mandatory minimum sentence based on the 
quantity of drugs involved. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(B) (2012).  However, the Holder Memo, 
which is no longer in place, instructed federal prosecutors to avoid charging low-level 
participants in drug-related crimes under statutes triggering the mandatory minimum 
penalties. See infra note 121. 
 3. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 180. 
 4. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge’s Striking Move in Felony Drug Case:  Probation, Not 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/nyregion/in-a-
striking-move-brooklyn-judge-orders-probation-over-prison-in-felony-drug-case.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3FW-ADMP]. 
 5. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, drug couriers account for 23 percent 
of federal drug-trafficking cases.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR DRUG OFFENSES 167–68 & fig.8-9 (2011), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/ 
mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB6M-
Q3KY].  The U.S. Sentencing Commission defines “courier” as one who “[t]ransports or 
carries drugs using a vehicle or other equipment.” Id. at 167.  A “mule,” on the other hand, is 
a person who “[t]ransports or carries drugs internally or on his or her person.” Id.  Because 
both couriers and mules occupy the lowest levels of the hierarchy of a drug-trafficking 
organization, this Note will use the term “courier” to encompass both couriers and mules. 
 6. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 189; see also Lincoln Caplan, Why a Brooklyn Judge 
Refused to Send a Drug Courier to Prison, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-a-brooklyn-judge-refused-to-send-a-
drug-courier-to-prison [https://perma.cc/H32R-JRLU]; Weiser, supra note 4. 
1752 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
boyfriend convinced her to visit some friends in Jamaica.7  He purchased 
Nesbeth’s plane ticket and told her to bring two suitcases back to the United 
States.8  Hidden in the suitcases’ handles was 1.3 pounds of cocaine, which 
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol seized upon Nesbeth’s arrival.9 
In his opinion, Judge Block stated that his decision to spare Nesbeth of 
approximately three years in prison was largely driven by the collateral 
consequences that she would suffer after her term of incarceration ended.10  
Judge Block also opined that despite his leniency in sentencing, legislative 
action was ultimately necessary to effectively mitigate the consequences of 
a felony conviction for low-level participants in drug-trafficking offenses.11  
This Note offers one potential legislative solution that would allow low-level 
drug couriers like Nesbeth to avoid the devastating consequences attending 
heightened sentences that far outweigh the culpability for low-level drug 
offenses.12 
The current legal landscape governing drug trafficking first emerged in the 
1980s, when the United States’s drug laws underwent a massive 
transformation; Congress, determined to win its “War on Drugs,” enacted 
several pieces of legislation intended to curb the influx of drugs into the 
United States.13  Also in the 1980s, Congress amended federal sentencing 
laws to limit judicial discretion.14  This undertaking involved adding 
stringent mandatory minimum penalties to many of the federal drug 
statutes.15  Lawmakers operated under the assumption that the quantity of 
drugs a person possessed correlated to the individual’s culpability; therefore, 
lawmakers tied the severity of the mandatory minimum penalties to the 
weight of the drugs seized.16 
 
 7. Caplan, supra note 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 190–93 (explaining the long-term consequences of 
incarcerating low-level drug offenders). 
 11. Id. at 198 (“It is for Congress and the states’ legislatures to determine whether the 
plethora of post-sentence punishments imposed upon felons is truly warranted, and to take a 
hard look at whether they do the country more harm than good.”). 
 12. See infra Part IV (proposing a legislative amendment to the federal importation 
statute).  This Note focuses solely on federal enforcement policy.  While there are applicable 
state laws under which couriers can be charged, this Note will not address them. See JOHN F. 
PFAFF, LOCKED IN:  THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL 
REFORM 13 (2017) (“A major barrier to reform . . . is the fractured nature of our criminal 
justice system.  In fact, there is no single ‘criminal justice system,’ but instead a vast 
patchwork of systems that vary in almost every conceivable way.”). 
 13. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 14. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–
2040 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–3586, 
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012)). 
 15. See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181. 
 16. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 12 (1986). 
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Low-level drug couriers have suffered major consequences as a result of 
these increased penalties.17  Drug-trafficking organizations target vulnerable 
individuals—typically women18—to become drug couriers in smuggling 
operations.19  Couriers often lack strong ties to the larger drug-trafficking 
conspiracy, and they are recruited only for the limited purpose of drug 
transportation.20  This job description means that couriers are in possession 
of often large quantities of drugs, which exposes them to significant 
mandatory minimum penalties but does not necessarily indicate a high status 
within the drug organization.21  For example, a courier in possession of just 
over one pound (or 500 grams) of cocaine might face a five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence.22  To make matters worse, because drug couriers have 
little involvement in the larger drug-trafficking conspiracy, they typically 
lack the valuable information needed to trade to the authorities in exchange 
for leniency.23  As a result, low-level drug couriers have very few options to 
avoid the stringent mandatory minimum sentences, and any options they do 
have may only provide limited relief.24  Even where couriers are lucky 
enough to appear before a judge who spares them of any jail time, they still 
face the long-term consequences of being labeled a convicted felon.25  Take 
Chevelle Nesbeth for example, who had to switch her college major from 
education to sociology because it is likely that her felony conviction will 
prohibit her from becoming a teacher.26 
This Note explores the discrepancy between the actual culpability of low-
level drug couriers and the harsh penalties that they face.  This Note evaluates 
the costs that current policies impose on individual defendants and society as 
 
 17. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 167 (estimating that high-level drug 
suppliers and importers account for less than 11 percent of federal drug cases). 
 18. See Stéphanie Martel, The Recruitment of Female “Mules” by Transnational Criminal 
Organizations:  Securitization of Drug Trafficking in the Philippines and Beyond, 1 SOC. 
TRANSFORMATIONS, Aug. 2013, at 13, 29 (explaining why drug-trafficking organizations 
recruit women as drug couriers). 
 19. Kevin Lerman, Note, Couriers, Not Kingpins:  Toward a More Just Federal 
Sentencing Regime for Defendants Who Deliver Drugs, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 702 (2017) 
(“Often drug-trafficking organizations recruiters—like others offering dangerous and risky 
employment—deliberately seek out people in dire circumstances to make them an offer they 
can’t refuse.”). 
 20. See Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure:  Low-Level Drug Offenders and 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1495 (2000) (explaining how 
drug couriers play a peripheral role in the overall drug-trafficking conspiracy). 
 21. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (2012) (prescribing mandatory minimum penalties 
tied to the quantity of drugs involved). 
 22. Id. § 960(b)(2)(B). 
 23. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking the Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 199, 211–13 (1993) (discussing how low-level offenders often lack valuable 
information to provide to the authorities). 
 24. See infra Part I.B.2.b (explaining the safety valve provision as a possible avenue of 
relief from mandatory minimum penalties). 
 25. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the effects of a felony conviction on, inter alia, 
employment prospects and eligibility for public benefits). 
 26. Caplan, supra note 6.  Ms. Nesbeth’s lawyer also commented that despite Judge 
Block’s leniency, “all these doors . . . are closed to [Nesbeth] based on her conviction.” 
Weiser, supra note 4. 
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a whole.  Ultimately, this Note concludes that the costs of harsh penalties for 
low-level drug couriers far outweigh the benefits and, therefore, proposes a 
legislative amendment to remedy these defects. 
Part I of this Note outlines the federal statutes that govern the prosecution 
of drug couriers and provides a brief history of the trajectory of this legal 
regime.  Part II then surveys the experiences and backgrounds of individuals 
who are recruited as low-level drug couriers.  Part II also highlights the 
increased use of women as low-level drug couriers and addresses likely 
explanations for why certain individuals are more vulnerable to drug courier 
recruitment.  Part III illustrates how the costs of the current policies outweigh 
the benefits, and Part IV addresses these failures by proposing a legislative 
amendment to the federal importation statutes that would create a carveout 
for low-level drug couriers. 
I.  THE DRUG-TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT REGIME:  FEDERAL 
STATUTORY AND SENTENCING LAWS 
GOVERNING THE IMPORTATION OF NARCOTICS 
Many of the developments to the law governing the prosecution of drug 
couriers occurred in the 1980s, and these policies have remained largely 
unchanged since then.27  This Part discusses these developments and explains 
the law as it currently stands.  Part I.A provides a brief history of the 
development of the current enforcement regime and specifically focuses on 
the history of the “War on Drugs” and sentencing reform, including the 
enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the rise of mandatory 
minimum sentences.  Part I.B outlines the legal landscape of federal 
enforcement of drug-trafficking crimes by highlighting the relevant statutes 
used to prosecute drug couriers.  It also discusses the two primary methods 
of departure from mandatory minimum penalties:  the “substantial 
assistance” provision and the “safety valve” provision. 
A.  How We Got Here:  A Brief History of the “War on Drugs,” the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, and the Rise of Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
This section explains the social context that informed President Ronald 
Reagan’s reforms, reviews the key pieces of legislation passed in the 1980s, 
and discusses the impact of that legislation on the enforcement of drug crimes 
today. 
1.  Sentencing Policy Leading Up to the 1980s 
The current enforcement regime of drug crimes in the United States is 
rooted in President Richard Nixon’s famous declaration of America’s “War 
on Drugs” in 1971.28  Yet, this “war” did not materialize until over a decade 
later, when the Reagan administration passed several pieces of landmark 
 
 27. See infra Part I.A. 
 28. A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/ 
issues/brief-history-drug-war [https://perma.cc/C2NW-KZME] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
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legislation that severely limited judicial discretion in sentencing29 and 
imposed stringent mandatory minimum penalties for a wide range of drug-
related offenses.30 
President Reagan’s legislative reforms can be characterized as reactionary 
measures designed to steer the prosecution of drug crimes toward a different 
approach than those used in the decades leading up to the 1980s.31  Prior to 
the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in 1984, judges had 
broad and nearly unlimited discretion to impose sentences that would best 
serve to rehabilitate the individual offender.32  Justice Hugo Black articulated 
these principles in Williams v. New York33:  “Retribution is no longer the 
dominant objective of the criminal law.  Reformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”34  The 
rationale behind rehabilitation-based sentencing can be analogized to a 
doctor’s diagnosis and treatment of a patient’s disease.35  For example, a 
conscientious physician would not give the same dose of chemotherapy to a 
thirty-year-old as she would to an eighty-year-old, even if the two patients 
suffered from the exact same form of cancer.36  It follows that “[h]ighly 
relevant—if not essential—to [the judge’s] selection of an appropriate 
sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant’s life and characteristics”37 so the sentencing judge can similarly 
make the right sentencing “diagnosis” for the defendant. 
While these principles aptly addressed the individualized, rehabilitative 
goal of criminal law, many commentators criticized the discretionary policies 
for producing significant sentencing disparities between similarly situated 
offenders.38  Critics of these policies frequently cited studies demonstrating 
the effect of gender, race, and socioeconomic status as predictors of 
 
 29. See generally Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 
1837, 1987–2040 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 
3581–3586, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012)). 
 30. See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 31. See Froyd, supra note 20, at 1473–74 (discussing how the Sentencing Reform Act 
came in response to the indeterminate sentencing policies prevalent in the 1970s). 
 32. See id. 
 33. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 34. Id. at 248. 
 35. Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing 
System:  Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 184–85 (1994). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. 
 38. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 21 
(1973) (lamenting that policies giving judges such considerable discretion have led to “widely 
divergent sentences where the divergences are explainable only by the variations among the 
judges, not by material differences in the defendants or their crimes”); Edward M. Kennedy, 
Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing:  Law with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 
353 (1979) (noting that sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders “can be 
traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and correctional 
authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence”). 
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sentences.39  These overt disparities armed the Reagan administration with 
the necessary political ammunition it needed to enact groundbreaking 
sentencing reform legislation throughout the 1980s. 
2.  Sentencing Reform and the “War on Drugs” 
The first of several key pieces of legislation came when Congress enacted 
the SRA in 198440 as part of the larger Comprehensive Crime Control Act.41  
The SRA sought to “reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity and eliminate 
the sentencing impact of extralegal factors.”42  More specifically, the SRA 
set out to accomplish three goals.  First, it sought to promote certainty and 
honesty—Congress wanted offenders to actually serve their full sentence.43  
Therefore, the SRA abolished the federal parole system in favor of a “real 
time” sentencing scheme.44  That is, judges would sentence defendants to 
concrete terms of imprisonment that defendants served completely without 
the opportunity for parole.45  Second, the drafters of the SRA wanted to 
advance uniformity and eliminate the disparities in sentencing that were 
criticized throughout the 1970s.46  Finally, the SRA sought to increase 
proportionality in sentencing by punishing offenders based on their 
culpability.47  To achieve these goals, the SRA established the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”), which was charged with 
creating guidelines that satisfied the broader themes of “just punishment” or 
retribution,48 specific and general deterrence,49 incapacitation of dangerous 
offenders,50 and limited forms of rehabilitation.51  The Commission is an 
independent agency of the judicial branch.52  After decades of unfettered 
judicial discretion in sentencing, the SRA transformed the criminal justice 
system in one swift stroke by implementing a uniform set of sentencing 
guidelines that every federal judge was required to follow.53 
 
 39. See Froyd, supra note 20, at 1473–74. 
 40. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–3586, and 
28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012)). 
 41. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 
1976–2194 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
 42. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 35, at 183. 
 43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 49. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 50. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 51. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2012); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 
(1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the SRA’s delegation of powers to the Commission). 
 53. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006) (commenting on how “sentencing has lurched from a lawless morass 
of hidden, unreviewable discretion to a sometimes rigid and cumbersome collection of rules”). 
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Two years after enacting the SRA, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 into law.54  In an attempt to address America’s drug 
problem, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act imposed stringent mandatory minimum 
sentences for manufacturing, transporting, distributing, and possessing 
illegal narcotics.55  Then, in 1988, the Reagan administration passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988,56 which established, inter alia, mandatory 
minimum penalties for the simple possession of five or more grams of crack 
cocaine.57  By shifting the focus from the offender’s role in the conspiracy 
toward the quantity of drug involved,58 these pieces of legislation “increased 
the likelihood that mandatory minimum penalties would apply equally to 
major traffickers, mid-level dealers, and low-level participants.”59 
3.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
The SRA authorized the Commission to establish the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) to eliminate the disparate sentencing of 
similarly situated offenders.60  The Commission designed the Guidelines to 
determine sentences based on both the offense committed and offender’s 
criminal history.61  First, the Guidelines dictate an appropriate sentence range 
based on the base level offense.62  Then, offenders are eligible to receive a 
number of upward or downward adjustments based on several factors.63  The 
Guidelines remained mandatory for decades—judges lacked discretion to 
 
 54. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 55. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)–(b) (2012). 
 56. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 57. “Crack cocaine” is the term used to describe “cocaine that has been processed with 
baking soda or ammonia, and transformed into a more potent, smokable, ‘rock’ form.” Crack 
Cocaine, CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RES., http:/www.cesar.umd.edu/cesar/drugs/crack.asp 
[https://perma.cc/G8M6-ZP3V] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 58. Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 212; see also Natasha Bronn, Note, “Unlucky Enough 
to Be Innocent”:  Burden-Shifting and the Fate of the Modern Drug Mule Under the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(f) Statutory Safety Valve, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 479 (2013). 
 59. Froyd, supra note 20, at 1488; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT 




 60. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2012). 
 61. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) 
(“The Commission is required to prescribe guideline ranges that specify an appropriate 
sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by coordinating the offense behavior 
categories with the offender characteristic categories.”). 
 62. Id. § 2D1.1. 
 63. For example, defendants may obtain a point reduction if they can establish that they 
played a “minor” or “minimal” role in the offense. Id. § 3B1.2.  Similarly, defendants who 
demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility may also obtain a point reduction. Id. § 3E1.1.  
For a comprehensive list of upward or downward adjustments, see id. ch. 3. 
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veer outside the prescribed guidelines range except in extraordinary 
circumstances.64 
In United States v. Booker,65 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
mandatory Guidelines violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and 
declared the Guidelines merely advisory.66  As a result, the Court reinvested 
judges with some of the discretion that the SRA and subsequent pieces of 
legislation had taken away.67  Yet despite Booker, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have been reluctant to exercise this discretion.68  For 
example, in Gall v. United States,69 the Court explained that district courts 
“should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the 
applicable Guidelines range.”70 
Furthermore, the Booker decision did not affect the constitutionality of 
mandatory minimum penalties, which take precedence over Guideline 
sentences and thus limit judicial discretion in sentencing.71  Thus, even if a 
judge wishes to depart from a Guidelines-prescribed sentence, if the crime 
triggers a statutory mandatory minimum penalty, the judge must impose at 
least the mandatory minimum.72  In order to evade these minimums, the 
prosecutor must file a motion for departure based on the substantial 
assistance provision73 or the defendant must qualify for the safety valve 
departure.74  Because of the widespread use of mandatory minimum penalties 
for enforcing drug-trafficking crimes,75 Booker’s impact has been relatively 
limited in drug courier prosecutions, and the law continues to promote a more 
uniform system of sentencing, with little discretion afforded to sentencing 
judges. 
B.  Federal Enforcement of Drug-Trafficking Laws 
Reagan-era sentencing reforms continue to impact and inform the current 
state of affairs.  This section explores the current statutory scheme.  It begins 
 
 64. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, 
and within the range, referred to in [the Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 65. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 66. Id. at 245. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Lerman, supra note 19, at 684 (describing how “districts’ practices of closely 
following the Guidelines remain deeply institutionalized”); see also Mona Lynch & Marisa 
Omori, Legal Change and Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker:  The Impact of Time and 
Place on Drug Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 411, 419–21 (2014). 
 69. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 70. Id. at 49. 
 71. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 72. See Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens:  Have the Sentencing Guidelines 
Eliminated Disparity?  One Judge’s Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (1997). 
 73. See infra Part I.B.2.a (discussing the substantial assistance departure). 
 74. See infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing the safety valve departure). 
 75. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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by discussing the statutes used to prosecute drug couriers and the mandatory 
minimum penalties the statutes prescribe.  It also discusses the substantial 
assistance and safety valve provisions—the two main ways defendants can 
avoid mandatory minimum penalties. 
1.  The Federal Importation Statute and Corresponding Mandatory 
Minimum Penalties 
When authorities catch a drug courier smuggling drugs into the United 
States, the courier is typically charged under the federal importation statute.76  
Offenders convicted of importing “controlled substances”77 are sentenced 
according to 21 U.S.C. § 960, which requires that offenders be given 
mandatory minimum penalties tied to the weight of the drugs involved.78  
Where an individual, in contravention of 21 U.S.C. § 952, knowingly or 
intentionally imports or exports one kilogram or more of heroin79 or five 
kilograms or more of cocaine,80 he or she faces a ten-year mandatory 
minimum penalty.81  Similarly, offenders are subject to a five-year 
mandatory minimum penalty if they are found guilty of importing or 
exporting 100 grams or more of heroin82 or 500 grams or more of cocaine.83 
Section 952, which makes it a crime to knowingly import drugs into the 
United States,84 arose out of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970,85 which was part of President Nixon’s early effort to 
address America’s drug problem.  The more important legislative 
development actually came in 1986, when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
amended § 960 (the “1986 Amendments”) to include mandatory minimum 
penalties tied to the weight of the unlawfully imported drugs.86  The 
legislative history surrounding the 1986 Amendments illustrates Congress’s 
concern with increased drug use in the United States and its desire to restrict 
 
 76. See 21 U.S.C. § 952 (2012). 
 77. According to the Controlled Substances Act, “There are established five schedules of 
controlled substances, to be known as schedules I, II, III, IV, and V.” Id. § 812(a).  The 
Attorney General may, by rule, add or remove any substance from a given schedule or transfer 
substances between schedules. Id. § 811(a)(1)–(2).  Examples of schedule I drugs include 
heroin, marijuana, and LSD. Drug Scheduling, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., 
https://www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling [https://perma.cc/5YMK-26QP] (last visited Feb. 12, 
2019).  Examples of schedule II drugs include cocaine and methamphetamine. Id. 
 78. 21 U.S.C. § 960. 
 79. Id. § 960(b)(1)(A). 
 80. Id. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 81. Id. § 960(b)(1).  If death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such 
substance, the mandatory minimum penalty increases to twenty years. Id. 
 82. Id. § 960(b)(2)(A). 
 83. Id. § 960(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 84. Id. § 952(a). 
 85. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 86. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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the supply of drugs.87  To that end, a 1986 House Judiciary Committee report 
advocated the view that the law should primarily target the high-level 
traffickers and organizational heads responsible for trafficking large 
quantities of drugs into the United States.88  The same report also noted that 
Congress’s second level of focus should be the street-level dealers.89  
Operating under the assumption that drug quantity correlates with status 
within the drug organization and individual culpability,90 Congress 
structured the mandatory minimum penalties to depend on the weight of the 
drugs involved.91 
Interestingly, the committee report lacks any mention of targeting the low-
level couriers who merely transport the drugs from place to place.92  While 
it is impossible to draw inferences about congressional intent from a failure 
to mention one subset of people in a committee report, the report’s discussion 
about organizational heads and mid-level dealers as the two greatest threats 
lends support to the notion that the 1986 Amendments were designed to 
capture the proverbial whales, not the minnows.93  The only committee report 
specifically mentioning drug couriers refers to more sophisticated, high-level 
couriers who transport drugs via private aircraft.94  In explaining the 
importance of authorizing appropriations for the U.S. Customs Service and 
its air interdiction mission, that report emphasizes that, at the time, 62 percent 
of cocaine entering the United States arrived in small, private aircraft.95  
Notably, this report does not mention low-level couriers, which further 
bolsters the argument that lawmakers were much more concerned with 
higher-level players when enacting the 1986 Amendments.96 
2.  Departing from the Mandatory Minimum Penalties 
When a courier is caught with a sufficient quantity of drugs to trigger a 
mandatory minimum sentence,97 the law provides two main avenues of 
departure:  (1) the substantial assistance provision; and (2) the safety valve.  
Defendants may also find relief if the prosecutor declines to charge the 
 
 87. The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control predicted that an estimated 
“85 tons of cocaine will enter the U.S. in 1984, compared with 25 tons in 1980,” and that 
between 8 and 20 million people in the United States use cocaine. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1199, at 
12 (1985). 
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 11–12 (1986) (“[T]he Federal government’s most intense 
focus ought to be on major traffickers, the manufacturers or the heads of organizations, who 
are responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities of drugs.”). 
 89. Id. at 12 (discussing how the law should also target “the person who is filling the bags 
of heroin, packaging crack into vials or wrapping [PCP] in aluminum foil”). 
 90. Id. (“[T]he committee selected quantities of drugs which if possessed by an individual 
would likely be indicative of operating at such a high level.”). 
 91. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a), (b)(4) (2012). 
 92. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 11–12 (1986). 
 93. See id. 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 99-734, at 21 (1986). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. A courier carrying 500 grams or more of cocaine or 100 grams or more of heroin 
receives a mandatory sentence of five years.  21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
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quantity of drugs sufficient to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence, as 
the U.S. Department of Justice under President Barack Obama did for certain 
low-level participants between 2013 and 2017.98 
a.  Substantial Assistance Departure 
An individual convicted of a drug-trafficking offense can avoid a 
mandatory minimum penalty by providing “substantial assistance” to law 
enforcement.99  The substantial assistance provision allows the court, upon a 
motion by the government, to impose a sentence below the statutory 
mandatory minimum “so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense.”100  The Guidelines include a similar provision, which allows judges 
to depart from the Guideline-determined sentence range if no mandatory 
minimum exists.101  The Guidelines also specify factors that sentencing 
judges should consider when determining the extent of the sentence 
reduction, such as the “significance and usefulness of the defendant’s 
assistance”;102 “the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any 
information or testimony provided by the defendant”;103 “the nature and 
extent of the defendant’s assistance”;104 “any injury suffered, . . . or risk of 
injury to the defendant or his [or her] family resulting from his [or her] 
assistance”;105 and “the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.”106  
According to the commentary, the government’s evaluation of the 
defendant’s assistance should be accorded much deference, “particularly 
where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain.”107 
b.  The Safety Valve Provision 
The second way a defendant can obtain a departure from the mandatory 
minimum penalty is through the safety valve provision.108  Congress enacted 
the safety valve provision in 1994 as part of the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act109 in response to low-level drug offenders receiving 
 
 98. See infra Part I.B.2.c. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 101. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 102. Id. § 5K1.1(a)(1). 
 103. Id. § 5K1.1(a)(2). 
 104. Id. § 5K1.1(a)(3). 
 105. Id. § 5K1.1(a)(4). 
 106. Id. § 5K1.1(a)(5). 
 107. Id. § 5K1.1 cmt. n.3. 
 108. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 109. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553).  The Commission added this 
exception to mandatory minimum sentencing in certain drug-related offenses at § 5C1.2 of the 
Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
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disproportionately long mandatory sentences.110  The safety valve was 
designed to serve as a narrow exemption for nonviolent, low-level 
offenders.111  Under the safety valve provision, the court may depart from a 
statutory mandatory minimum penalty if the following criteria are met: 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as 
determined under the sentencing guidelines; 
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or 
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another 
participant to do so) in connection with the offense; 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 
others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and 
was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section 
408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has 
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the 
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same 
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the 
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the 
Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a 
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with the 
requirement.112 
The safety valve differs from the substantial assistance departure in two 
key ways.  First, the safety valve does not require a motion from the 
government.113  Instead, judges have discretion to apply the safety valve 
provision if the defendant satisfies the five criteria.114  Second, the fifth 
element of the safety valve provision explicitly states that the information 
defendants provide to the government need not be new and useful, so long as 
it is comprehensive and truthful.115 
Though not mandatory,116 the Guidelines are instructive in determining 
how much relief to provide to safety-valve-eligible defendants.117  The 
Guidelines state that defendants meeting the safety valve criteria “for whom 
the statutorily required minimum sentence is at least five years, the offense 
 
 110. See Froyd, supra note 20, at 1472. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012) (emphasis added).  The recently passed First Step Act 
seeks to expand the protections of the safety valve by including individuals with limited 
criminal histories. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221; 
see also Justin George, What’s Really in the First Step Act?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 
2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/16/what-s-really-in-the-first-
step-act [https://perma.cc/PWW8-MEJ9]. 
 113. See Bronn, supra note 58, at 482. 
 114. In this respect, the safety valve is an excusal, rather than a departure, from the 
mandatory minimum sentence. Id. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (“[T]he fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other 
information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not 
preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.”). 
 116. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 117. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
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level applicable from Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three 
(Adjustments) shall be not less than level 17.”118  According to the 
sentencing table, a defendant with an offense level of 17 and no criminal 
history faces a Guideline sentence of twenty-four to thirty months.119  And 
while judges are free to disregard the Guidelines in imposing a sentence, the 
Guidelines nonetheless serve as an important starting point and remain 
influential in sentencing.120 
c.  The Rise and Fall of the Holder Memo 
In 2013, then–U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder set forth a policy that 
sought to avoid charging low-level participants in drug crimes under statutes 
that triggered mandatory minimum sentences.121  The Holder Memo, as it 
became known, instructed Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) to conduct an 
individualized assessment of each defendant prosecuted under a Controlled 
Substances Act statute with a mandatory minimum sentence to determine 
whether the defendant was, in fact, a low-level participant.122  AUSAs were 
to weigh several criteria, including whether the conduct involved the use of 
violence or weapons, whether the crime involved minors, whether death or 
serious bodily injury resulted, whether the defendant was a leader within the 
criminal organization, whether he or she had significant ties to large-scale 
drug-trafficking organizations, and finally, whether the defendant had a 
criminal history.123  If, based on those factors, the AUSA was satisfied that 
the defendant was indeed a low-level participant, the Holder Memo 
instructed the AUSA to decline to charge the quantity of drugs sufficient to 
trigger the mandatory minimum sentence.124  This policy allowed many low-
level drug couriers, like Chevelle Nesbeth,125 to escape § 960’s mandatory 
minimum sentences.126 
However, the relief provided by the Holder Memo quickly dissipated in 
2016 with the election of President Donald Trump and the appointment of 
Jefferson Sessions as U.S. Attorney General.  Shortly into his tenure, 
Sessions released a memo, commonly known as the Sessions Memo, that 
effectively overturned the policies laid out in the Holder Memo and 
 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 120. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 121. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to the U.S. Attorneys & Assistant 
Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div. 2 (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Holder Memo], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-
policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-
drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2FR-U3UN]; see also Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks 
to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drug-sentences.html [https://perma.cc/EMN4-
TQMV]. 
 122. Holder Memo, supra note 121, at 2. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 126. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (2012). 
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instructed AUSAs to resume charging all drug offenders to the fullest extent 
of the law.127  The Sessions Memo states:  “Any inconsistent previous policy 
of the Department of Justice relating to these matters is rescinded, effective 
today.”128  Although it is possible that the Trump administration changes 
course in light of the bipartisan First Step Act,129 the Sessions Memo 
continues to govern the approach of the nation’s ninety-three U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices toward low-level drug couriers.130 
II.  BECOMING A DRUG COURIER:  UNDERSTANDING THE EXPERIENCES 
AND MOTIVATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO SMUGGLE DRUGS 
This Part introduces the group of individuals predominately affected by 
the laws discussed in Part I.  Part II.A describes the role of drug couriers in 
larger drug-trafficking schemes, distinguishes between experienced and low-
level drug couriers, and provides a more in-depth analysis of low-level 
couriers as a particular group of interest.  Part II.B assesses the circumstances 
that push individuals toward low-level drug smuggling.  First, Part II.B 
highlights the high-risk, low-reward reality of being a low-level drug courier, 
and then it seeks to explain why individuals choose to become couriers by 
analyzing the widespread fear and poverty prevalent in communities affected 
by the drug trade. 
A.  The Role of the Drug Courier and the Rise of Low-Level Drug Couriers 
Drug couriers are responsible for smuggling drugs from one point to 
another, often across international borders.131  Although many drug couriers 
occupy the lowest levels of the drug organization’s hierarchy,132 not all drug 
couriers are alike.133  It would be misguided to say that all couriers are simply 
 
 127. Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors 1 
(May 10, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Memo], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/4HH5-HAHT] (“[I]t is a core principle that 
prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense. . . .  By 
definition, the most serious offenses are those that carry the most substantial guidelines 
sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences.”); see also Sari Horwitz & Matt 




 128. Sessions Memo, supra note 127, at 2.  The Sessions Memo explicitly referred to the 
Holder Memo in a footnote defining inconsistent previous policies. Id. at 2 n.1. 
 129. Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/3F5R-XPCD]. 
 130. See Sessions Memo, supra note 127, at 2. 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(describing how the defendant smuggled drugs from Jamaica to the United States). 
 132. See Lerman, supra note 19, at 701 (“[O]n average, couriers’ economic positions vis-
à-vis the enterprise they work for paint a picture of a uniformly powerless, unskilled labor 
force.”). 
 133. See id. (“[C]ouriers and mules vary in what types of drugs they cross in what quantity, 
and in their pay.”). 
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unwitting agents of the organization’s higher-ups; some couriers run 
sophisticated operations to smuggle drugs across borders.134  For example, 
some drug-trafficking organizations employ trained high-level couriers to fly 
private aircraft filled with illegal narcotics into the United States.135  In fact, 
the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 specifically 
mentions this subset of drug couriers as a particular threat.136  Other drug 
couriers—through experience—have developed effective methods of 
bypassing law enforcement’s detection efforts at the border.137 
As law enforcement ramped up interdiction efforts and developed new 
methods to detect and apprehend drug couriers, drug-trafficking 
organizations responded with innovative ways to insulate high-level 
members and continue smuggling drugs into the United States, which 
included recruiting outside individuals to act as drug couriers.138  These low-
level drug couriers have little to no involvement in the larger drug-trafficking 
operation and, as a result, possess limited information of value to law 
enforcement in the event that they are apprehended.139  Low-level drug 
couriers typically know only the name of the person who gave them the drugs 
(who is usually located in a foreign country)140 and the person to whom they 
are supposed to deliver the drugs (who is likely known by an alias or even 
just by a general description).141  Ultimately, drug-trafficking organizations 
and their leaders view low-level drug couriers as disposable resources; 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. See, e.g., Tristan Kirk, Drug Smugglers Who Flew £2.5m Cocaine Haul to UK on 
Light Aircraft Jailed for 40 Years, EVENING STANDARD (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:46 PM), 
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/drug-smugglers-who-flew-25m-cocaine-haul-to-uk-
on-light-aircraft-jailed-for-40-years-a3457971.html [https://perma.cc/56PT-N8F3]; David M. 
Zimmer, Ringwood Man Convicted of Smuggling Cocaine on Private Planes, NORTH JERSEY 
REC. (Oct. 5, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/passaic/ringwood/ 
2018/10/05/ringwood-nj-man-convicted-smuggling-cocaine-private-planes/1536415002/ 
[https://perma.cc/UEY2-HLG6]. 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 99-734, at 21 (1986); see also supra notes 94–95 and accompanying 
text. 
 137. See Howard Campbell, Female Drug Smugglers on the U.S.-Mexico Border:  Gender, 
Crime, and Empowerment, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 233, 254–55 (2008) (describing the 
methods some “seasoned veteran” couriers employed in driving drugs across the U.S.-Mexico 
border, which included “dress[ing] like a hooker,” disguising drugs as wrapped Christmas 
presents during the holiday season, and even stuffing their children’s toys with drugs). 
 138. See id. at 253. 
 139. Bronn, supra note 58, at 479 (“Research into drug operations has demonstrated that, 
when hiring mules and couriers for their ventures, upper-level organizers often intentionally 
hire persons who have no information about the distributor in order to protect their 
organizations should the mules be apprehended.”); see also Lerman, supra note 19, at 694 
(explaining how low-level drug couriers lack information on the larger drug conspiracies). 
 140. Steven B. Wasserman, Toward Sentencing Reform for Drug Couriers, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 643, 643 (1995) (discussing how drug couriers often work for suppliers operating from 
abroad). 
 141. Mireya Navarro, Colombia’s Heroin Couriers:  Swallowing and Smuggling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 2, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/02/us/colombia-s-heroin-couriers-
swallowing-and-smuggling.html [https://perma.cc/3V9M-TJVX] (describing how drug 
couriers do not know the identities of cartel lieutenants but rather know them by descriptions, 
such as “Gordo” or “Flaco”). 
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resources that they are willing to sacrifice to the authorities in order to protect 
themselves and their larger operation.142 
Large drug-trafficking organizations, in their efforts to evade law 
enforcement and border agents, have increasingly recruited women to 
smuggle drugs into the United States143 because they believe that women are 
more effective drug couriers.  From the perspective of law enforcement 
officers, for example, women may appear less dangerous and thus less 
suspicious.144  Furthermore, women are perceived to have certain physical 
advantages when it comes to concealment because they can transport drugs 
vaginally, between their breasts, in brassieres or other female clothing 
articles, or in faked pregnancies.145  Female couriers have even smuggled 
drugs in breast or buttocks implants.146  While drug-trafficking organizations 
do not exclusively use women as drug couriers,147 the perceived advantages 
of using women have made female drug couriers a significant subgroup of 
individuals involved in drug smuggling.148 
B.  Motivations of Low-Level Drug Couriers 
To design effective criminal justice policies, it is critical to understand why 
individuals commit crimes.  This section describes the risks that low-level 
drug couriers face and the benefits they derive.  It also discusses the factors 
that frequently drive individuals into these situations. 
1.  High Risk, Low Reward:  The Realities of Being 
a Low-Level Drug Courier 
Low-level drug couriers face significant legal and physical risks.149  The 
legal risks stem from the statutory association of quantity of drugs with 
 
 142. See Lerman, supra note 19, at 694. 
 143. See Campbell, supra note 137, at 253 (“The expansion of female drug smuggling is 
part of women’s attempts at economic advancement and coincides with the efforts of drug 
cartels to create new and innovative ways to avoid detection . . . .”); Tracy Huling, Women 
Drug Couriers:  Sentencing Reform Needed for Prisoners of War, 9 CRIM. JUST., Winter 1995, 
at 15, 15 (“[W]omen drug couriers should be a population of particular concern to policy 
experts examining the effects of the global war on drugs.”). 
 144. Martel, supra note 18, at 29 (“[D]rug syndicates use women couriers because it is 
easier for women to get through entry points.”). 
 145. See Campbell, supra note 137, at 254. 
 146. See id.; Christopher Woody, Fake Vegetables, Frozen Sharks, and an Xbox—Here 
Are Some of Drug Smugglers’ Most Bizarre Methods, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2017, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/drug-smugglers-methods-hiding-places-2017-4 
[https://perma.cc/S95H-A6A2]. 
 147. Drug organizations have also exploited other groups of harmless looking, and often 
vulnerable, people to smuggle drugs, such as the elderly. Ron Nixon, Drug Traffickers Turn 
to New Type of Courier:  Seniors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/02/11/us/politics/drug-traffickers-turn-to-new-type-of-courier-seniors.html 
[https://perma.cc/X62H-B282]. 
 148. See Huling, supra note 143, at 15. 
 149. See Lerman, supra note 19, at 682 (describing drug couriers are “those who are 
recruited—and often exploited—to handle the riskiest part of the enterprise:  the 
transportation”). 
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organizational status and culpability.150  Because of the mandatory minimum 
penalties in place, if they smuggle enough drugs, drug couriers can receive 
long prison sentences despite their low status within the drug-trafficking 
organization.151  Furthermore, they are often intentionally kept in the dark 
about the inner workings of the drug-trafficking organization, so they lose 
out on a valuable bargaining chip with prosecutors and are deprived of an 
opportunity to qualify for the substantial assistance departure.152  In addition 
to assuming significant legal risk, drug couriers often undertake risks to their 
health and physical well-being.153  In cases where couriers have ingested 
pellets of drugs—such as cocaine or heroin—the risk of death or serious 
bodily injury is extremely high if the pellet opens while inside the courier.154 
Despite these risks, low-level couriers rarely stand to benefit from the sale 
of the drugs they carry.155  Drug couriers are generally paid a relatively small, 
flat fee for their services and do not receive a share of the profits like more 
highly ranked members of the organization do.156  While a few thousand 
dollars may be enough to affect the circumstances of those recruited to be 
low-level drug couriers,157 it is a rather inconsequential sum compared to the 
profits generated by the drug-trafficking organization.158  In 2016, the 
average retail price for a gram of cocaine in the United States, adjusted for 
 
 150. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 12 (1986) (discussing 
how possessing certain quantities of drugs are indicative of high status within the 
organization). 
 151. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b); see also supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
 152. See infra Part III.B (discussing how many low-level drug couriers are ineligible for 
the substantial assistance departure because they lack valuable information on the drug-
trafficking conspiracy). 
 153. See Maria Florencia Alcaraz, What It’s Like to Be a Female Drug Mule Serving Time 
in Prison, BROADLY (May 13, 2016, 9:05 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
vv5949/what-its-like-to-be-a-female-drug-mule-serving-time-in-prison [https://perma.cc/ 
JR8B-7FKT]; Navarro, supra note 141. 
 154. See Alcaraz, supra note 153 (describing drug-filled capsules as “ticking time bombs”); 
Navarro, supra note 141 (discussing how ingesting heroin pellets, while less risky than 
ingesting cocaine pellets, nonetheless results in many deaths when the pellets open). 
 155. See Wasserman, supra note 140, at 651 (“Like a beast of burden, [the courier] was 
employed to transport another’s goods, ignorant of the heightened risks (mainly to herself) or 
heightened benefits (entirely to another) . . . .”). 
 156. One empirical study on drug couriers’ pay found that the median compensation for 
couriers caught at California ports of entry was $1313 per trip. David Bjerk & Caleb Mason, 
The Market for Mules:  Risk and Compensation of Cross-Border Drug Couriers, 39 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 58, 58 (2014).  According to these figures, a courier would need to complete over 
two trips per month to earn an annual salary of approximately $35,000. Id. at 58–59; see also 
Huling, supra note 143, at 59 (“[Drug couriers] are paid anonymously, in insignificant 
amounts.”). 
 157. See Lerman, supra note 19, at 702 (“Courier work offers a temporary income increase 
that would be unlikely in most other jobs in the border region.  In fact, that is very frequently 
the reason people are willing to accept drug-trafficking organizations’ propositions.”). 
 158. See Heroin and Cocaine Prices in Europe and USA, UNITED NATIONS OFF. DRUGS & 
CRIME, https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/heroin_and_cocaine_prices_in_eu_and_usa 
[https://perma.cc/P9F7-GH3B] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
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purity, was $165.159  A courier carrying 900 grams of cocaine,160 for 
example, may be paid a few thousand dollars as a flat fee161 despite having 
delivered a product that could potentially yield over $148,000 in retail 
value.162  Similarly, in 2016, the average street value of heroin was $491 per 
gram, adjusted for purity,163 so a courier delivering the same amount brings 
in over $441,000 for the organization.  Considering the legal and health risks 
that couriers assume, as well as the value they bring to the drug-trafficking 
organizations that recruit them, low-level drug couriers are paid far less than 
what their services are worth. 
2.  Why They Do It:  Fear and Poverty Drive Recruitment 
of Low-Level Drug Couriers 
Understanding what drives low-level drug couriers to undertake such high-
risk, low-reward assignments is crucial in assessing the effectiveness of the 
current policies164 and addressing their flaws.165  One of the main motivators 
for low-level drug couriers is fear.  This is particularly true for the large 
numbers of female drug couriers involved in relationships with men who 
have strong ties to drug-trafficking organizations.166  As one scholar notes, 
while the wife or partner of an individual who commits a white collar crime 
is often shielded from criminal activity, the wife or partner of a drug dealer 
is much more exposed.167  Women who are physically and psychologically 
abused by male drug dealers in their lives are especially susceptible to 
involvement and participation in the overarching drug-trafficking 
enterprise.168  For example, Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of 
New York observed that “[m]any women who commit drug crimes do not 
 
 159. Id.  The average price of cocaine, not adjusted for purity, was $93 per gram in 2016. 
Id. 
 160. The average internal courier swallows approximately two pounds of drugs, which 
equals just over 900 grams. Navarro, supra note 141.  Couriers who hide the drugs in their 
suitcases are capable of carrying even more. 
 161. See Bjerk & Mason, supra note 156, at 58–59. 
 162. See Heroin and Cocaine Prices in Europe and USA, supra note 158. 
 163. See id.  The average price of heroin, not adjusted for purity, was $152 per gram in 
2016. Id. 
 164. See infra Part III. 
 165. See infra Part IV. 
 166. See, e.g., Shimica Gaskins, Women of Circumstance—the Effects of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing on Women Minimally Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1533, 1533 (2004) (“These ‘women of circumstance’ find themselves incarcerated and subject 
to draconian sentences because the men in their lives persuade, force, or trick them into 
carrying drugs.”); Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the Drug War’s Female Casualties, 6 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 277, 280 (2002) (“[A] major way that women have been caught in the crossfire 
of the drug war has been through heterosexual relationships with men engaged in drug 
activity.”). 
 167. Myrna S. Raeder, “Gender Neutral” Sentencing Wreaks Havoc in the Lives of Women 
Offenders and Their Children, 8 CRIM. JUST., Fall 1993, at 21, 60. 
 168. See Gaskins, supra note 166, at 1534. 
2019] THE COURIER CONUNDRUM 1769 
act completely under their own volition, but rather out of fear of the 
dominant, abusive men in their lives.”169 
Even where couriers are not involved in abusive relationships, fear is a 
powerful force in communities largely dominated by the drug trade.170  An 
undercover U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent identified 
fear as a key component used by Mexican drug cartels to retain control over 
the people in their communities.171  This DEA agent lamented that Mexican 
civilians will not provide law enforcement with information on the Sinaloa 
Cartel, for example, because “[t]hey know their family back home will be 
killed.”172  The agent’s testimony illustrates the immense power that drug-
trafficking organizations wield in their communities and the relative ease 
with which they force ordinary citizens to act on their behalf. 
Poverty and lack of economic opportunity are other powerful drivers for 
the recruitment of low-level drug couriers.  Many low-level drug couriers 
come from backgrounds that afford them little opportunity to obtain 
prosperous livelihoods.173  This is especially true for women in certain 
cultures, like those in Latin America and the Caribbean, where deep-set 
gender norms have discouraged women from obtaining an education and 
gainful employment.174  For example, one empirical study of the drug trade 
in Barbados found that poverty was a key motivator for women employed as 
drug couriers.175  The situation can be even more dire for women who are the 
sole caretakers of children.  One woman arrested for smuggling drugs 
explained the situation, saying:  “You could face the fact of being in prison—
but then again, having four kids, working day and night, you’re a mother on 
your own, you haven’t got any father . . . .  Basically you just need a 
 
 169. Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the 
Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 170 (1996). 
 170. See Guy Lawson, How the Cartels Work, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/how-the-cartels-work-245912/ 
[https://perma.cc/UB3L-2J4H]; Navarro, supra note 141 (describing a low-level drug courier 
as being “among the increasing numbers of South Americans who, under threat or for money, 
act as human vessels for thousands of pounds of Colombian heroin being smuggled into the 
United States” (emphasis added)). 
 171. Lawson, supra note 170. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Navarro, supra note 141 (describing how most Colombian heroin couriers are 
illiterate and poor). 
 174. Many of the drugs smuggled into the United States do not come directly from their 
“source country” as that would likely raise the suspicions of law enforcement.  Rather, in an 
effort to elude authorities, drugs are filtered through a number of “transit countries” in the 
Caribbean before being smuggled into the United States. Corin Bailey, Exploring Female 
Motivations for Drug Smuggling on the Island of Barbados:  Evidence From Her Majesty’s 
Prison, Barbados, 8 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 117, 123 (2013) (“The location of the Caribbean 
has made it one of the world’s major drug transshipment points as it is situated between South 
America—the world’s largest producer of cocaine, and its main markets in the United States 
of America and Europe.”). 
 175. Id. at 121; see also Huling, supra note 143, at 59 (explaining that women often become 
involved in the drug-trafficking business as a survival strategy in the face of economic 
necessity). 
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change—not only for yourself but for your kids.”176  Moreover, women with 
sole responsibilities for their children may face greater difficulties in 
obtaining an education or steady employment.177  These circumstances likely 
propel women into a vicious cycle of necessity and desperation where low-
level drug smuggling might appear to be the only way to make ends meet.178  
Drug-trafficking organizations also stand to benefit and thus exploit these 
situations, as widespread poverty increases the pool of potential recruits to 
smuggle drugs across borders at low cost to the organization.179  
Notwithstanding the realities low-level drug couriers face,180 they suffer 
astonishingly severe punishments under the current laws.181 
III.  FAILURES OF THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT REGIME 
Taking into consideration the current state of the law and the individuals 
impacted by it, this Part analyzes the costs and benefits of the current drug 
enforcement regime.  Part III.A begins by exploring the costs of current 
enforcement policies, including the financial costs and the less easily 
quantifiable collateral costs that the policies impose on innocent third parties 
and on formerly incarcerated individuals.  Next, this Part analyzes purported 
benefits of the current policies.  Part III.B unpacks the common justification 
that harsh penalties are necessary to induce low-level participants to provide 
information about higher-level dealers and distributors.  Finally, Part III.C 
evaluates current policies through the lenses of the various theories of 
punishment:  retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  This 
Part ultimately illustrates that the current regime’s costs outweigh its benefits 
and that reforms are necessary to address these imbalances. 
A.  High Costs of Current Enforcement Policies 
The policy of pursuing harsh sentences for low-level offenders like drug 
couriers has contributed to a surge in the prison population.182  The total U.S. 
prison population183 has ballooned from approximately 300,000 in 1980 to 
nearly 1.5 million in 2016—a 500 percent increase.184  And for drug crimes 
alone, the number of individuals incarcerated in federal prison grew from 
4700 to nearly 82,000 over the same period.185  These sharp increases have 
 
 176. Jamaica’s Women Drug Mules Fill UK Jails, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2003, 6:56 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3097882.stm [https://perma.cc/6FKC-PGGM]. 
 177. Bailey, supra note 174, at 128. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Lerman, supra note 19, at 702 (explaining how drug-trafficking organizations 
intentionally seek out vulnerable individuals as drug couriers). 
 180. See supra Part II.B. 
 181. See supra Part I.B. 
 182. See, e.g., Fact Sheet:  Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 1, 
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FE5U-QFAK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (detailing various metrics of 
prison population growth in the United States). 
 183. This includes both state and federal prisons. 
 184. Fact Sheet:  Trends in U.S. Corrections, supra note 182, at 1. 
 185. Id. at 3. 
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led to significant economic costs as the United States spends an average of 
roughly $36,000 per federal inmate annually.186  Perhaps more significant 
than the financial costs, however, is the collateral damage that incarceration 
imposes on families of incarcerated individuals and the long-term 
consequences suffered by individuals after they are released from 
incarceration. 
1.  The Effects on Families and Children 
When a judge sentences an individual with children to a term of 
incarceration, the judge inevitably assesses a penalty on the child or children 
of that individual.187  Judges should consider this impact on children when 
calculating the costs of a criminal justice policy.188  But, despite the well-
documented effects that parental incarceration has on children, the 
Guidelines instruct courts to disregard these effects when crafting an 
“appropriate” sentence.189 
In general, parental incarceration is correlated with a wide range of 
detrimental effects on a child’s development.190  When a parent is sentenced 
to prison time, children often experience grief, anxiety, and depression, 
which psychologists have equated to the emotional responses associated with 
the death of a loved one, abuse, or domestic violence.191  In addition to 
mental health effects, parental incarceration is also associated with adverse 
physical health outcomes, like childhood obesity and asthma.192  The 
children of incarcerated parents also experience significant long-term effects 
that may inhibit their educational and occupational achievement.193  Even 
 
 186. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,863 (Apr. 
30, 2018).  The federal government operates on the fiscal calendar of October to September. 
Id. 
 187. See generally Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate:  The Challenges of Creating 
Change for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385 (2018) (describing the 
many obstacles children of incarcerated parents face both during and after their parent’s period 
of incarceration). 
 188. This is not to say that defendants with children are less culpable or deserving of less 
punishment than defendants without children.  It is only intended to convey the reality that 
incarceration imposes costs on third parties other than the defendant, which must be 
considered to accurately determine whether the benefits of a criminal justice policy outweigh 
the costs. 
 189. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) 
(“[F]amily ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a 
departure may be warranted.” (emphasis added)). 
 190. See, e.g., Stephanie Bush-Baskette, The War on Drugs and the Incarceration of 
Mothers, 30 J. DRUG ISSUES 919, 923 (2000) (discussing the negative impacts of parental 
incarceration on children); Cyphert, supra note 187, at 390–91 (same).  But see Cyphert, supra 
note 187, at 390 (“Where an incarcerated parent was abusive . . . their absence may improve 
a child’s situation, at least temporarily.”). 
 191. See Bush-Baskette, supra note 190, at 923; Cyphert, supra note 187, at 390–91. 
 192. See Cyphert, supra note 187, at 391.  Cyphert notes that these physical conditions are 
generally more pronounced in children living in poverty, who also happen to be most affected 
by parental incarceration. Id. at 391 n.24. 
 193. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., A SHARED SENTENCE:  THE DEVASTATING TOLL OF 
PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON KIDS, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 3 (2016), 
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after a parent’s release, these negative impacts often persist and last through 
adulthood:  parental incarceration is a “strong risk factor for antisocial 
behavior, future offending, . . . drug abuse, school failure, and 
unemployment.”194  According to one study, children who experience the 
trauma of losing a parent to the criminal justice system are five times more 
likely than other children to end up incarcerated as adults.195 
These effects are particularly pronounced for the children of drug couriers 
because women represent a significant number of the individuals convicted 
of importing drugs into the United States.196  This reality is important for two 
reasons.  First, 80 percent of the total number of incarcerated women in the 
United States are mothers.197  Second, incarcerated women are more likely 
than incarcerated men to be the sole caregivers to their children.198  When a 
drug courier is sent to prison, there is a high likelihood that her children are 
losing not only a parent, but the only parent in their household.199  The effects 
can be devastating because these children are likely to experience the 
aforementioned psychological, physical, and socioeconomic difficulties,200 
and to a more severe degree.201  As noted by Judge Weinstein, “Removing 
the mother in such a matriarchal setting destroys the children’s main source 
of stability and guidance and enhances the possibility of their engaging in 
destructive behavior.”202  Additionally, the loss of the sole caregiver may 
trigger the provisions of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(ASFA), which terminates parental rights once a child has been in foster care 
for fifteen or more of the past twenty-two months.203 
One way to mitigate the effects of parental incarceration is through 
increased visitation.204  However, several obstacles may inhibit visitation.  
 
http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-asharedsentence-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK5L-
6HF7] (describing how parental incarceration disrupts educational performance and is 
associated with higher drop-out rates). 
 194. Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family:  Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children 
in the Administration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 31 (2013). 
 195. Bush-Baskette, supra note 190, at 923. 
 196. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text (describing the expanded role women 
have played in drug smuggling operations). 
 197. Wendy Sawyer & Wanda Bertram, Jail Will Separate 2.3 Million Mothers from Their 
Children This Year, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 13, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
blog/2018/05/13/mothers-day-2018/ [https://perma.cc/ZUQ4-6833]. 
 198. See Bush-Baskette, supra note 190, at 920; Nancy Gertner, Women Offenders and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 297 (2002). 
 199. See Bush-Baskette, supra note 190, at 920; Gertner, supra note 198, at 297. 
 200. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text. 
 201. See, e.g., THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 193, at 3 (discussing how children 
of incarcerated mothers are more likely to drop out of school). 
 202. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (2012).  One way to avoid the consequences of the ASFA is to place 
the children with relatives during the period of incarceration. See Barbara Bloom, Barbara 
Owen & Stephanie Covington, Women Offenders and the Gendered Effects of Public Policy, 
21 REV. POL’Y RES. 31, 41 (2004).  However, individuals caring for their relatives’ children 
are entitled to fewer benefits than parents, which makes this solution impractical and 
challenging for many of limited economic means. Id. 
 204. See Cyphert, supra note 187, at 394 (discussing the benefits of increased visitation to 
both the child and the parent); see also NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE 
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The first and most obvious challenge is the distance that families must travel 
to see their loved ones in federal correctional facilities.  According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 84 percent of parents in the federal prison system 
are incarcerated more than 100 miles from their last residence.205  This 
problem is heightened for women because there are only a handful of federal 
prisons for female inmates.206  To make matters worse, the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP) is not obligated to follow a sentencing judge’s 
recommendation that a defendant be placed in a federal prison that is in close 
proximity to the inmate’s family.207  Closely related to the problem of 
location is the financial burden of travel, lodging, and meals that visitation 
presents.208  These hardships acutely impact the families of drug couriers, 
who often already face financial difficulty that served as a—if not the—
motivation for the courier’s criminal activity in the first place.209  Moreover, 
many drug couriers have family overseas,210 which makes visitation 
prohibitively expensive.  Even where families can muster up the funds to visit 
a loved one in prison, many federal correctional facilities have visitation 
policies that make it difficult for incarcerated parents to interact with their 
children.211  As a result, the innocent children and families of incarcerated 
parents suffer tremendously both during and after the term of incarceration.  
These burdens must be considered when assessing the true costs of the 
current enforcement policies vis-à-vis drug trafficking crimes. 
 
POLICY CTR., BROKEN BONDS:  UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN 
WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS 10 (2008), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/ 
31486/411616-Broken-Bonds-Understanding-and-Addressing-the-Needs-of-Children-with-
Incarcerated-Parents.PDF [https://perma.cc/B8TW-L4L4] (“[M]aintaining contact with one’s 
incarcerated parent appears to be one of the most effective ways to improve a child’s emotional 
response to the incarceration and reduce the incidence of problematic behavior.”).  While not 
all scholars agree that increased visitation benefits the child, “[n]o studies have shown that 
visitation in prison destroys the benefits [associated with] parent/child visitation.” Benjamin 
Guthrie Stewart, Comment, When Should a Court Order Visitation Between a Child and an 
Incarcerated Parent?, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 165, 175 (2002). 
 205. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR 
CHILDREN 5 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPV4-
JBGG]. 
 206. Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50 FAM. 
CT. REV. 231, 231 (2012); see also Gaskins, supra note 166, at 1551 (discussing how 
incarcerated women are often located farther away from their families than incarcerated men). 
 207. The BOP’s statutory authority dictates only that the BOP must ensure that the facility 
of its choosing “meets minimum standards of health and habitability.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) 
(2012); see also United States v. Jessop, No. 1:04-CR-159 (GLS), 2006 WL 1877143, at *1 
(N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006) (holding that the “BOP has the exclusive right to designate the place 
of confinement” and “it has the discretion to consider judicial recommendations concerning 
such matters as proximity to family” but “the court has no jurisdiction to supersede the BOP’s 
authority” (emphasis added)). 
 208. See Cyphert, supra note 187, at 396. 
 209. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 211. See Cyphert, supra note 187, at 397 (discussing how inconvenient visitation hours, 
parking difficulties, a lack of private or child-friendly visitation rooms, and strict visitation 
eligibility rules can deter families, especially children, from visiting incarcerated parents). 
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2.  Life After Incarceration 
Another important consideration in determining the true costs of the 
current enforcement policies is the impact that incarceration has on the 
individual’s future opportunities.  As Professor Michelle Alexander wrote, 
the current “laws, rules, and regulations operate to discriminate against ex-
offenders and effectively prevent their reintegration into the mainstream 
society and economy.”212  Alexander added that the restrictions in place 
“amount to a form of ‘civic death’ and send the unequivocal message that 
‘they’ are no longer part of ‘us.’”213  Formerly incarcerated individuals suffer 
many consequences that persist long after their sentences end, including, but 
not limited to, the loss of employment opportunities,214 voting rights,215 and 
public benefits.216 
The data indicate that past incarceration—of any length—negatively 
impacts an individual’s employment prospects upon release.217  According 
to the Prison Policy Initiative, the unemployment rate among formerly 
incarcerated individuals is 27 percent,218 which is approximately five times 
higher than that of the general population.219  It also surpasses the U.S. 
unemployment rate at the peak of the Great Depression, which was 
25 percent.220  Broken down by gender and race, the data show that formerly 
incarcerated Black and Hispanic women are in an even worse position, with 
unemployment rates of 43.6 percent and 39.4 percent, respectively.221  Even 
where formerly incarcerated individuals do obtain employment, a significant 
percentage are only able to find part-time or occasional work.222  Black 
women and Hispanic women fare the worst, with only 40 percent and 43 
percent able to secure full-time employment, respectively.223  Because many 
low-level drug couriers come from Central America, South America, or the 
 
 212. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 142 (2012). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See, e.g., Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work:  
Unemployment Among Formerly Incarcerated People, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 2018), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html [https://perma.cc/9QC3-NNEG]. 
 215. See, e.g., Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/S46S-6KBZ] 
(last updated Dec. 21, 2018). 
 216. See, e.g., Molly Born, In Some States, Drug Felons Still Face Lifetime Ban on SNAP 
Benefits, NPR:  THE SALT (June 20, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/ 
2018/06/20/621391895/in-some-states-drug-felons-still-face-lifetime-ban-on-snap-benefits 
[https://perma.cc/Y8H3-T9UK]. 
 217. See Couloute & Kopf, supra note 214. 
 218. This figure is based off of data from 2008, the most recent year for which data on this 
topic are available. Id. 
 219. In 2008, the U.S. unemployment rate was just over 5 percent. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. These figures reflect the percentages of the entire population of formerly incarcerated 
Black and Hispanic women, not the percentages of formerly incarcerated, but employed, Black 
and Hispanic women. Id.  Furthermore, 20 percent of Black women and 18 percent of Hispanic 
women were employed on a part-time or occasional basis. Id. 
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Caribbean224 and are Black or Hispanic, these figures indicate that the post-
incarceration job market looks even less promising for them, which 
exponentially increases the social costs of incarcerating them.225 
Even where the safety valve provision functions effectively,226 and a 
defendant’s prison sentence is significantly reduced, the defendant still faces 
the long-term consequences of being labeled a “convicted felon.”227  Among 
the vast consequences that individuals who have been convicted of felonies 
suffer,228 one that is particularly important for convicted drug couriers is the 
loss of certain public benefits.229  In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into 
law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act,230 which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program.231  TANF also included a number of provisions reining in welfare 
benefits by imposing strong work requirements232 and closing out such 
benefits to individuals with felony convictions.233  Section 115 of the Act 
specifically closes out certain public benefits to “individual[s] convicted . . . 
of any offense which is classified as a felony . . . and which has as an element 
the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance.”234 
 
 224. See supra notes 143–48, 173–76 and accompanying text. 
 225. According to one report, the U.S. economy loses between $57 and $65 billion in 
output of goods and services from formerly incarcerated individuals. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD 
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useful information to prosecutors, most defendants who qualify for reduced sentences are 
benefitting from the safety valve provision. See infra Part III.B. 
 228. See, e.g., United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 190–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(describing the lost benefits that result from a felony conviction). 
 229. This section will focus primarily on individuals who were eligible to receive such 
benefits prior to their felony convictions.  Because eligibility, in certain circumstances, may 
depend on an individual’s citizenship status, not all individuals convicted of low-level drug-
trafficking crimes may have been eligible to receive certain public benefits in the first place.  
This Note will not delve into the nuances of the eligibility rules but rather will explain the 
consequences of a drug felony conviction on individuals who were previously eligible to 
receive federal public assistance benefits. 
 230. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 11 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 231. See The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 
the US, CTR. FOR PUB. IMPACT (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-
study/personal-responsibility-and-work-opportunity-reconciliation-act-the-clinton-welfare-
reform/ [https://perma.cc/9PMV-FTKW]. 
 232. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 115(a), 110 Stat. at 2180–81. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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Individuals convicted as drug couriers under the importation statute fall 
squarely within this provision, and may thus suffer the severe consequence 
of a lifetime ban on receiving certain forms of public assistance.235  Given 
the myriad of challenges that formerly incarcerated individuals face in 
finding employment236 and the fact that this plight is even worse for Black 
and Hispanic women,237 this is a particularly troublesome reality.  If formerly 
incarcerated drug couriers cannot secure employment and are closed out from 
public assistance benefits, where do they turn?  One option might be to return 
to criminal activity as a way to support themselves and their families.  
Another option might be to entrench themselves in their relationships with 
male partners, even if the men are abusive, involved in the drug trade, or 
both.  Interestingly, the current policy of charging low-level drug couriers 
with felonies and sentencing them to extended periods of incarceration 
perpetuates the conditions that frequently push such individuals to commit 
drug-trafficking crimes in the first place.238 
Family disruption, difficulty finding employment, and loss of public 
benefits are just a few of the many collateral costs of a felony conviction and 
incarceration.  Because these consequences acutely affect the subsets of 
individuals at the greatest risk of being recruited as drug couriers, like Black 
and Hispanic women,239 these consequences are especially important in 
assessing the true costs of the current enforcement policies as they relate to 
low-level drug-trafficking crimes. 
B.  Going After the Minnows to Catch the . . . Minnows? 
One common justification for pursuing harsh penalties for low-level drug 
offenders is that such penalties incentivize defendants to cooperate with the 
government and provide information that aids in prosecuting the more 
culpable higher-level offenders in the drug-trafficking organization.240  The 
substantial assistance provision241—which offers defendants an avenue of 
relief from the mandatory sentence on the condition that they provide new 
and useful information to the government—reflects this consideration.242 
For most drug couriers, however, the substantial assistance provision is not 
a viable option for relief because drug-trafficking organizations often 
intentionally keep the couriers uninformed as a way to insulate their high-
 
 235. Currently, states differ in their treatment of individuals convicted of drug-related 
felonies.  In West Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi, for example, individuals falling 
within this category still face a lifetime ban on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) benefits, or food stamps, as they are more commonly known. See Born, supra note 
216. 
 236. See supra notes 217–25 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 143–48, 173–76 and accompanying text. 
 240. See Lerman, supra note 19, at 694 (describing the criminal justice system as a “system 
built around cooperation”). 
 241. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 242. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K1.1(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
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level members.243  While couriers may have information on the individuals 
who originally gave them the drugs to import, this intelligence is often of 
little use to prosecutors because those individuals are typically outside the 
United States.244  Additionally, the leaders of the drug-distribution 
conspiracy have every incentive to withhold the true identity of the person to 
whom the couriers are delivering the drugs and simply provide an alias or 
general description.245  Because of the circumstances that render the couriers 
so vulnerable to being recruited in the first place, they often obey their 
superiors unquestioningly.246 
The disparate impact produced by the substantial assistance departure is 
well-documented and has been referred to as the “cooperation paradox.”247  
Under the cooperation paradox, more culpable offenders receive lighter 
sentences because they possess valuable information, and low-level couriers 
receive harsher sentences because they have no information with which to 
bargain.248  In the rare event that couriers possess information that they are 
willing to provide to the government, couriers are unlikely to benefit from it 
because it is either unreliable or already known.249  The cooperation paradox 
demonstrates the flaws in the logic that going after the proverbial minnows 
is the best way to get the whales—at least in cases involving low-level drug 
couriers.  If pursuing harsh penalties for low-level drug couriers is ineffective 
as a mechanism for prosecuting the more culpable dealers and distributors, 
what benefit do these policies actually offer? 
C.  Insufficient and Greater Than Necessary:  Failures of the Current 
Policies Under the Various Theories of Punishment 
In addition to failing to aid law enforcement in prosecuting high-level drug 
distributors,250 the current enforcement policies of harshly penalizing low-
level couriers fall short under the various punishment objectives set forth in 
the SRA.251  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, courts must “impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary”252 to promote retributive 
principles,253 to deter future criminal conduct,254 to protect the public by 
 
 243. See Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 211–13 (discussing the ways in which the substantial 
assistance provision benefits more culpable drug offenders, but not lower-level offenders); 
Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission’s Drug Guidelines:  Courier Cases Where 
Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 63, 64 (1990) (same). 
 244. See supra notes 140, 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 166–79 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 211–13. 
 248. See id. at 213 (“Instead of a pyramid of liability with long sentences for leaders at the 
top of the organizational ladder, the mandatory system can become an inverted pyramid with 
stiff sentences for minor players and modest punishments for knowledgeable insiders . . . .”). 
 249. Id. at 211–13. 
 250. See supra Part III.B. 
 251. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 254. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
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incapacitating the offender,255 and to rehabilitate the defendant.256  This 
section explores how the current policies fare in achieving each of these 
objectives. 
1.  Retribution 
Advocates of retributivism or “just deserts”—unlike the forward-looking 
utilitarian theories of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—seek to 
impose on a defendant a “morally just” sanction that is commensurate with 
the degree of harm suffered by society.257  One straightforward application 
of retribution as a theory of punishment is the death penalty.258  By inflicting 
upon a defendant the same degree of harm that he or she has caused to his or 
her victim, capital punishment comports with the idea of lex talionis (“an eye 
for an eye”) and illustrates retributive principles in their purest form.259  Yet, 
with the exception of capital punishment, lex talionis is often too extreme in 
its practical application to be a guiding principle for advocates of the 
retributivist theory.260  It also provides very little direction for punishing 
victimless crimes—including many of the drug crimes the federal 
government prosecutes.261  A more workable application of retributivism 
focuses on the individual’s moral blameworthiness and seeks an accordant 
punishment.262  From this principle, it follows that more serious crimes (i.e., 
those that involve a higher degree of moral blameworthiness) should be 
punished more severely.263 
Weight-based enforcement policies for drug crimes find their justification 
in retributivist principles.264  To illustrate, if one measures the harm inflicted 
upon society by the quantity of drugs that end up on the street, then a 
retributivist would likely support a weight-based sentence by associating the 
quantity of drugs with the quantity of harm perpetuated.265  However, 
 
 255. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 256. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 257. JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 57 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2016). 
 258. Id. at 58. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 
415 (“[N]o retributivist would embrace the claim that the state ought generally to be in the 
business of perpetrating the horrors on offenders that match in kind the horrors that they 
perpetrated on their innocent victims.”); see also David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1657 (2010) (“[T]he explicit task of retributivism as a theory of justice 
is to resist slavery to emotions like anger and bloodlust in favor of cool reason.”). 
 261. PFAFF, supra note 257, at 58. 
 262. Id. at 58–59.  One difficulty in applying retributivist principles to sentencing policies 
is reconciling conflicting views on moral blameworthiness and justice. See id.  However, this 
Note will not explore the merits of retributivism as a theory of punishment.  Rather, it will 
analyze the current enforcement of low-level drug couriers through a retributivist lens.  For a 
more detailed discussion on the merits of retributivism, see John Kleining, What Does 
Wrongdoing Deserve?, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST:  HAS IT A FUTURE? 46, 47–48 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 2011). 
 263. See PFAFF, supra note 257, at 58–59. 
 264. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
 265. See PFAFF, supra note 257, at 58. 
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retributivism looks not only at the harm society suffers but also the moral 
blameworthiness of the defendant.266  To equate societal harm with moral 
blameworthiness would be to take an overly simplistic view of 
retributivism.267  Drug couriers, despite the quantity of drugs they import 
(and the risk they assume), occupy the lowest levels of the drug-trafficking 
organization’s hierarchy and derive very little benefit from their actions.268  
This reality must be considered in assessing their moral blameworthiness 
through a retributivist lens.269 
Couriers agree to undertake these high-risk, low-reward trips because of 
the difficult circumstances they face.270  Poverty, extreme deprivation, and 
fear all limit the choices that individuals have and increase the likelihood that 
they will resort to crime.271  It follows that individuals from these 
backgrounds are less culpable and less morally blameworthy than others who 
have a wider range of choices.272  Because the current weight-based 
enforcement policies for drug-trafficking crimes fail to account for the 
defendant’s role in the organization and his or her overall moral 
culpability,273 they fail to satisfy the objectives of retribution as a theory of 
punishment. 
2.  Deterrence 
The second factor that district courts should consider under § 3553 is 
whether the punishment will “afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct.”274  Deterrence, as a normative goal of punishment, comes in two 
forms:  general deterrence and specific deterrence.275  General deterrence 
seeks to structure punishments in a way that will discourage all potential 
lawbreakers from committing crimes.276  Specific deterrence shifts the focus 
to the specific offender, asking whether the punishment he or she currently 
suffers will prevent him or her from committing crimes in the future.277  
Specific deterrence is only a consideration once general deterrence has failed 
 
 266. See Mirko Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender:  Why It (Sometimes) Matters in 
Sentencing, 33 LAW & INEQ. 1, 10–13 (2015). 
 267. See id. 
 268. See supra notes 132, 138–42, 155–63 and accompanying text. 
 269. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 168 (“The Commission’s analysis also 
revealed that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense is not closely related to the offender’s 
function in the offense.” (emphasis added)). 
 270. See supra notes 166–79 and accompanying text. 
 271. See Bagaric, supra note 266, at 10–13. 
 272. See id. at 13 (“The disadvantaged are less morally blameworthy for criminal acts 
because, relatively speaking, well-off individuals find it easier to comply with the criminal 
law and have a greater motivation to do so.”). 
 273. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 168. 
 274. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 275. PFAFF, supra note 257, at 39. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
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and the threat of punishment was not enough to prevent the individual from 
committing the crime.278 
From a general deterrence perspective, the current policy of pursuing harsh 
penalties for low-level drug couriers is unlikely to have a measurable impact 
on drug-trafficking crimes.279  In general, the value of severe criminal 
penalties as a deterrent is questionable.280  While there is evidence to support 
the value of punishment as an important mechanism for deterring crime,281 
the evidence fails to support the conclusion that the deterrent effect becomes 
more powerful as the severity of the punishment increases.282  Instead, 
increasing punishment severity produces diminishing marginal returns in 
terms of crime control and deterrence.283 
Deterrence theory is also premised on the assumption that individuals are 
self-interested, rational actors who evaluate the costs and benefits of their 
actions.284  It is questionable whether people actually conform their behavior 
 
 278. See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 
200 (2013) (“Specific deterrence concerns the aftermath of the failure of general deterrence—
the effect on reoffending, if any, that results from the experience of actually being punished.”).  
Because this Note’s ultimate resolution focuses mainly on low-level couriers with little to no 
experience with the criminal justice system, this section will focus almost exclusively on 
general deterrence.  However, for more information on specific deterrence as a theory of 
punishment, see Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior 
Convictions of the Person That Committed the Crime:  An Argument for Less Impact Being 
Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 385–88 (2014). 
 279. While the existing research and literature does not directly address the deterrent value 
of incarceration on low-level drug couriers as a specific subset of criminals, there is much 
evidence to support the notion that severe punishments do not effectively deter individuals 
that share many of the same characteristics and sociological profiles of the individuals this 
Note addresses. See Bagaric, supra note 266, at 43–44. 
 280. See id. 
 281. See id. (“[I]n the absence of the threat of punishment for criminal conduct, the social 
fabric of society would readily dissipate; crime would escalate and overwhelmingly frustrate 
the capacity of people to lead happy and fulfilled lives.”); see also Daniel S. Nagin, 
Deterrence:  A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 
83, 85 (2013) (discussing how certainty of punishment functions as an effective deterrent); 
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 n.1 (2010) (“It is easy enough to see that criminal 
deterrence frequently and effectively influences our actions.  We all ‘throw out the anchor’ on 
the highway when we spot a patrol car.  We generally do not park in handicapped-only parking 
spots.  We do not light up a joint at the movies.”). 
 282. See, e.g., Bagaric, supra note 266, at 44; Gary Kleck, Brion Sever, Spencer Li & Marc 
Gertz, The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 623, 626 (2005); 
Nagin, supra note 281, at 85. 
 283. See Will Kenton, Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lawofdiminishingmarginalreturn.asp [http://perma.cc/ 
S9FL-EFPK] (last updated May 22, 2018) (“The law of diminishing marginal returns states 
that, at some point, adding an additional factor of production results in smaller increases in 
output.”).  Applied to punishment and deterrence, this concept means that adding an additional 
unit of punishment, measured in prison time, results in smaller increases in the deterrent effect. 
See id. 
 284. See Paternoster, supra note 281, at 782 (“[T]he decision to commit crime is no 
different than the decision to go to college or to get married—it is made by reasonable, rational 
agents who are self-interested and select behaviors that provide more rewards than costs.”). 
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to this model.285  It is true that human beings are rational in that they 
understand costs and benefits and respond to them accordingly.286  But there 
are a number of factors that impact the extent of human rationality and thus 
the predictive capabilities of the deterrence model.287  One important factor 
that affects this internal cost-benefit analysis is the immediacy of those costs 
or benefits.288  Because punishments are usually not suffered until long into 
the future, as compared to gains, which are generally immediate, the cost-
benefit calculus becomes skewed and the punishment’s deterrent effect more 
limited.289 
Harsh sentences are particularly ineffective in deterring most low-level 
drug couriers, whose circumstances make it even less likely that they will be 
able to rationally assess the costs and benefits of their actions.290  A 
substantial number of low-level drug couriers resort to criminal conduct as a 
result of grave economic difficulties.291  The circumstances these couriers 
face are likely to skew the cost-benefit calculation underlying the theory of 
deterrence.292  First and foremost, individuals coming from economic 
disadvantage have less to lose than those coming from privilege.293  
Furthermore, evidence indicates that poverty negatively impacts the 
development of children, which leads to poor impulse control.294  
Lawmakers should take these observations into account in evaluating the 
deterrent value of harsh criminal punishments for drug couriers, many of 
whom have lived their entire lives in dire economic circumstances.295  The 
same logic applies to couriers who are victims of abuse or who are under 
other forms of threat.296  To the extent that the courier calculates the costs 
and benefits of her decision to smuggle drugs, at the forefront of her mind is 
inevitably the immediate abuse that she will suffer if she does not 
 
 285. See id. at 819–21. 
 286. See id. at 819. 
 287. Id. at 821. 
 288. Id. (“For deterrence to work well, the would-be offender, tempted by the immediate 
gains of committing the crime, must be able to quickly conjure up in her mind the anticipated 
pain of punishment.”). 
 289. Id. (“Think for a moment of the predicament of the dieter tempted by a delicious slice 
of chocolate cake.  The pleasures are powerful and immediate, and the pain of added pounds 
is down the road, removed in time.”); see also Hans von Hentig, The Limits of Deterrence, 29 
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555, 559 (1938) (“[T]he criminal seems to be in part a 
human specimen, whose appetites and desires are irresistibly attracted by a near object.”). 
 290. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 291. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 292. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 293. See Bagaric, supra note 266, at 13 (“The reason that financially prosperous people 
often do not commit crime is because they have too much to lose from the incidental adverse 
consequences of a conviction, including the negative impact on their employment, reputation, 
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 294. See Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency:  Advancing the Nature and Logic 
of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 865–66 (2008) (discussing that where traumas 
are experienced early in life, whether in the form of poverty, abuse, racial discrimination, or 
otherwise, individuals are more prone to engage in criminal activity). 
 295. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
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participate.297  The legal punishment she may suffer in the future is likely to 
play a lesser role in her calculation compared to the more immediate costs or 
benefits that tend to weigh more heavily in the decision-making process.298 
It would exceed the bounds of logic to conclude that harsh criminal 
penalties could deter individuals who are already risking their lives for a 
relatively small monetary gain.299  In the case of couriers who ingest dozens 
of heroin- or cocaine-filled pellets, the risk of death or serious bodily injury 
is significant.300  If the individual rationally assesses the decision to smuggle 
drugs and decides that risking her life is worth a few thousand dollars, then 
her current circumstances are likely so dire that a harsh criminal penalty is 
unlikely to have any deterrent effect.  If the individual is not rationally 
calculating the costs and benefits of her decision to smuggle, it undercuts the 
very foundation on which deterrence theory rests.  Whichever it is, increasing 
the severity of criminal penalties is unlikely to impact their deterrent value 
vis-à-vis low-level drug couriers. 
3.  Incapacitation 
Much like deterrence, incapacitation is a consequentialist theory of 
punishment, which seeks to impose penalties as a means of preventing future 
crime.301  However, incapacitation theory is more narrowly focused in that 
punishments are designed to prevent individuals from committing future 
offenses.302  The most common way to incapacitate an individual, and 
prevent her from committing future crimes, is through incarceration.303  In 
its simplest terms, incapacitation seems to provide an adequate justification 
for the current enforcement of low-level drug couriers.  By sentencing 
couriers to long terms of incarceration, the justice system prevents them from 
importing more drugs into the United States during their sentence and 
effectively satisfies the objective of incapacitation.304 
However, incapacitation theory is much more nuanced, and it is important 
to analyze those intricacies before fairly assessing whether it justifies long 
prison sentences for low-level drug couriers.  Proponents of incapacitation 
theory emphasize the importance of optimal incapacitation, which involves 
arriving at a sentence for which the benefits of incapacitation outweigh the 
costs of incarceration.305  In this respect, incapacitation theory involves a 
cost-benefit analysis, where the benefits are the social improvements that 
 
 297. See Paternoster, supra note 281, at 821; von Hentig, supra note 289, at 558–59. 
 298. See Paternoster, supra note 281, at 821; von Hentig, supra note 289, at 558–59. 
 299. See supra notes 149–63 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 301. PFAFF, supra note 257, at 44–45. 
 302. Id. 
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future criminal activity.  A rather extreme example is chemically castrating a rapist to prevent 
him from raping again. Id. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. at 45. 
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result from having individuals incarcerated306 and the costs are not only the 
financial costs of incarceration, but also the collateral damage resulting from 
incarceration.307  Thus, if the sentence is excessive and its costs outweigh its 
benefits, it does not provide optimal incapacitation. 
Crucial to measuring the benefit derived from incapacitating an individual 
who has committed an offense is the replacement effect of an arrest and 
subsequent incarceration of a defendant.308  That is, incapacitation is only 
effective at reducing crime insofar as new individuals are not willing to 
replace incarcerated individuals.309  Many of the shortcomings of the War on 
Drugs may be due in some part to the replacement effects of incarcerating 
individuals involved in drug crimes,310 which are particularly apparent in the 
case of low-level drug couriers.  A review of the legislative history of the 
1986 Amendments reveals that Congress did not consider the possible 
replacement effects of implementing harsh mandatory sentences for low-
level offenders.311  Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the criminal 
acts of many low-level drug couriers strongly support the conclusion that 
they are disposable and easily replaceable resources in the scheme of the 
larger drug operation.312  Because the socioeconomic circumstances that 
render so many individuals vulnerable to recruitment as couriers broadly 
affect communities, compared to specific individuals, it is likely very easy 
for drug organizations to choose from an abundant supply of potential 
couriers.313  The fact that many couriers are kept uninformed of the details 
of the importation conspiracy—as a way to insulate the higher-ups in the 
event that the couriers are apprehended—further supports this conclusion.314  
Drug organizations need not provide couriers with any potentially valuable 
information, because of the ease with which they can find new recruits whose 
circumstances render them desperate enough to accept the high-risk, low-
reward role of a courier.315  The Commission corroborates these conclusions, 
finding that 77 percent of cocaine couriers are engaged in a single 
transaction.316 
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To achieve true incapacitation and crime control, resources would be better 
spent addressing the circumstances that make drug couriering such an 
attractive option for vulnerable individuals in impoverished communities.  
Efforts to increase economic opportunities and to provide actual relief to 
victims of domestic violence might be more effective in preventing 
individuals from acting as drug couriers than would incarcerating them. 
Incapacitation need not come in the form of incarceration; in fact, it need 
not come in the form of punishment at all.317  For example, helping a person 
find gainful employment may very well stop her from dealing drugs because 
it provides her with a steady income and takes up time that she might 
otherwise spend fraternizing with drug organizations.318  Similarly, 
providing someone with an opportunity to become a prosperous member of 
her community might incapacitate her motivation to become a drug 
courier.319  Such efforts would also reduce the replacement effect of 
individuals who do commit crimes and are caught because they would lower 
the supply of vulnerable recruits.320  However, the current regime focuses on 
incarceration as the proper way to incapacitate drug couriers and restrict 
future crime.  In doing so, it fails to recognize the circumstances of the people 
whom they are prosecuting and, as a result, fails to achieve real reform.321 
4.  Rehabilitation 
The final factor that § 3553(a)(2) instructs courts to consider focuses on 
the rehabilitation of the defendant.322  Incarceration may be a useful 
mechanism for achieving rehabilitation to the extent that it can provide 
incarcerated individuals with the tools and training they need to succeed 
when their sentence ends and they return to society.323  But the current 
policies, which have resulted in tremendous growth in the prison 
population,324 have made rehabilitation very difficult to achieve in the federal 
correctional system.  Prison overcrowding is a well-documented obstacle to 
effective rehabilitation because it threatens the prison’s ability to provide 
basic human needs, like healthcare and food, let alone effective educational 
and training programs.325  If the current policy of pursuing long prison 
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 321. See supra Part II.B.2.  While much more could be said about efforts to bring about 
substantive socioeconomic reform in these communities, this Note does not focus on them. 
 322. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012) (instructing courts to consider the need for the 
sentence “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”). 
 323. See PFAFF, supra note 257, at 48. 
 324. See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text. 
 325. Overcrowding, PENAL REFORM INT’L, https://www.penalreform.org/priorities/prison-
conditions/key-facts/overcrowding/ [https://perma.cc/HJ9P-ZAU4] (last visited Feb. 12, 
2019). 
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sentences for low-level drug couriers continues and prison populations 
continue to grow, rehabilitation efforts will inevitably suffer.326 
Because women are often recruited as low-level drug couriers and 
subsequently incarcerated,327 the correctional system should recognize the 
differences between men and women, including their pathways to crime and 
how the criminal justice system should address them.328  However, it was not 
until relatively recently that these differences were even acknowledged in the 
field of criminology,329 and the male-centric criminal justice system has been 
slow to respond with efforts to effectively rehabilitate women.330  
Approximately 90 percent of women suffer from some form of trauma when 
entering the correctional system,331 which may be the result of physical or 
sexual abuse or separation from their children.332  However, female 
correctional facilities have been ill-equipped to address these issues.333  A 
September 2018 Office of the Inspector General report reviewing the BOP’s 
management of female inmates identified a number of flaws in the BOP’s 
trauma treatment program, including inadequate staffing, which render the 
program ineffective.334  Until the BOP implements the necessary changes to 
ensure that all inmates in need of trauma-related services receive them, 
effective rehabilitation cannot be achieved for a substantial number of drug 
couriers in the federal correctional system. 
IV.  THE COURIER CARVEOUT:  A LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION TO THE HIGH 
COSTS OF PROSECUTING LOW-LEVEL DRUG COURIERS 
The current enforcement policy of pursuing harsh punishments for low-
level drug couriers is costly, both monetarily and in terms of the collateral 
damage it imposes on the defendants and innocent third parties.335  
Furthermore, the benefits of these policies fail to outweigh their costs.  
Because low-level drug couriers often possess little to no information on the 
larger operation, harsh enforcement policies are not effective mechanisms for 
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incentivizing cooperation or obtaining important information on more 
culpable players within the drug enterprise.336  Moreover, the current 
sentencing schemes fail to satisfy the objectives of the punishment laid out 
in the SRA.337  This Note proposes a legislative amendment to the federal 
importation statute,338 which would create a carveout for low-level drug 
couriers who meet certain criteria.  The provision would require that 
defendants meeting the criteria be charged with a separate misdemeanor 
falling outside the realm of the Guidelines and the mandatory minimum 
sentences currently in place under § 960.339 
A.  Proposed Criteria 
The criteria used to determine whether a defendant qualifies for the 
misdemeanor carveout would correlate to certain factors that indicate an 
individual’s position within the hierarchy of a drug organization.  
Fortunately, one need not look far for suitable models because the Holder 
Memo laid out a set of criteria for AUSAs to use to determine whether a 
defendant was a low-level participant.340  The Holder Memo criteria focused 
on the use of weapons or violence, the involvement of minors, whether the 
defendant was a leader in or had ties to the drug-trafficking organization, and 
whether the defendant had a criminal history.341  These criteria serve as a 
useful starting point, but they fail to address the specific factors that make an 
individual a leader, a high-ranking member, or a low-level participant in the 
drug-trafficking enterprise. 
The safety valve provision represents another effort to identify low-level 
participants and provide relief from the mandatory minimum sentences in 
place.342  The safety valve criteria do not differ much from the Holder Memo 
criteria as they also focus on, inter alia, criminal history,343 the use of 
violence or weapons,344 and whether the defendant was a leader or 
organizer.345  However, the safety valve criteria also fail to specify the 
characteristics common to low-ranking members in a drug-trafficking 
organization.  However, an article critiquing the safety valve criteria listed 
specific factors that could serve as a useful starting point for a statutory 
carveout.346  The critique proposed an amendment to the safety valve 
provision, which would direct courts to consider the following criteria:  
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whether the defendant received a small, flat fee payment versus a percentage 
of profits; whether the defendant simply delivered drugs one way and did not 
deliver money in return; whether the defendant received a prepackaged bag; 
whether the defendant delivered the package to a previously unknown 
individual; whether the defendant negotiated the terms of the sale; and 
whether the defendant owned or financed the drugs involved.347  These 
factors directly address many of the experiences common to low-level drug 
couriers348 and would thus effectively filter them out while still maintaining 
harsher penalties for those occupying more senior roles in the drug 
organization. 
B.  Advantages of the Carveout 
A statutory carveout specifically targeting low-level couriers has several 
important advantages over the current policies.  First, the amendment would 
move the law away from the current quantity-based model.349  It would 
charge and punish individuals based not on the weight of drugs they possess, 
but on their actual culpability, as derived from their status in the drug-
trafficking enterprise.  It was the goal of the drafters of the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act to punish high-level players more severely,350 but those drafters 
wrongly assumed that the quantity of drugs in one’s possession was the best 
indicator of status.351  A carveout exempting qualifying low-level couriers 
from mandatory minimum sentences, but maintaining such punishments for 
high-level players, is consistent with the goals of the drafters of the 1986 
Amendments.  This proposal also recognizes that not all drug couriers are 
alike, and thus the criteria would effectively distinguish between experienced 
couriers and low-level couriers.  By more accurately assessing and punishing 
based on culpability, this legislative amendment also satisfies retributivist 
goals of punishment.352 
Although the safety valve also functions to spare low-level drug offenders 
from harsh mandatory minimum sentences,353 it has a number of flaws that 
an amendment to the importation statute could address.  First, even where the 
safety valve functions effectively, defendants can still face substantial prison 
sentences under the Guidelines.354  If judges choose to disregard the 
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Guidelines, the problem of excessive judicial discretion arises.  Certain low-
level defendants may receive leniency, while others still face harsh 
punishments.  This problem is precisely what sparked the massive 
transformation of sentencing law in the early 1980s.355  By amending the 
importation statute, all defendants meeting the criteria would be charged with 
a newly created misdemeanor offense, which only carries a maximum 
sentence of one year.356  This amendment would significantly narrow the 
range of possible sentences available to the judge and would promote 
uniformity among similarly situated offenders without sacrificing the ability 
of the law to distinguish between offenders demonstrating different levels of 
culpability. 
Additionally, the safety valve does not address the long-term 
consequences that accompany a felony conviction, such as the inability to 
secure employment357 and the loss of certain public benefits,358 even in cases 
where its application spares the defendant of prison entirely.  By charging a 
qualifying defendant with a misdemeanor rather than a felony, this proposed 
amendment would significantly reduce the collateral costs incurred by 
society under the current system.  Charging low-level couriers with a 
misdemeanor would also result in monetary cost savings because it would 
reduce the number of people in the prison system overall and may further 
preserve resources by inducing more defendants to accept plea deals rather 
than going to trial.  This would not only give defendants the ability to move 
forward with their lives, but it would also free up prosecutors to use their 
resources to pursue more dangerous offenders. 
Finally, a legislative amendment has certain advantages over executive 
action like the Holder Memo.  While executive action is easier to implement, 
it is also easier to overturn, as was the case when former Attorney General 
Sessions revoked the Holder Memo.359  Although this proposal would require 
approval in both houses of Congress and the president’s signature, its effects 
would endure.  A legislative solution—if passed—would also more 
accurately reflect the democratic preferences of the American people than 
would executive action. 
C.  Potential Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this proposal is that it still leaves prosecutors 
with considerable discretion to charge low-level drug couriers under other 
statutes that trigger mandatory minimum sentences.  For example, a 
prosecutor could charge a low-level courier under 21 U.S.C. § 841, which 
makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess with the intent to 
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distribute a controlled substance.360  Alternatively, a prosecutor could 
achieve the same result by charging a low-level courier who transported 
drugs via airplane under 21 U.S.C. § 959.361  One way to address this issue 
would be to simply trust prosecutors to charge low-level drug couriers under 
the newly created misdemeanor carveout.362  A more effective, albeit more 
difficult, resolution would involve amending each and every felony provision 
under which prosecutors could plausibly charge low-level drug couriers to 
include this carveout for qualifying defendants.  While this would require 
significantly more congressional action, it would effectively remove the 
possibility that low-level drug couriers are charged with felonies that trigger 
mandatory minimum penalties. 
Critics of this proposal may argue that it is unlikely to produce any direct 
benefits—other than a reduction in costs—distinct from those currently 
provided by enacted laws and policies.  For example, it may be argued that 
creating a misdemeanor carveout would be unlikely to serve as a more 
effective deterrent than the current policies363 or induce more cooperation of 
low-level players than the current policies do.364  But, as discussed above, 
empirical evidence does not support a correlation between punishment 
severity and deterrence.365  Moreover, low-level drug couriers are unlikely 
to possess any helpful information for government investigators.366  Thus, 
while these justifications may have been rationally employed to undergird 
prior criminal justice reforms, their subsequent repudiation renders them 
ineffective as critiques of this proposal. 
In addition, this proposal may give rise to indirect long-term benefits.  
From a rehabilitation perspective, for example, incarcerating fewer people, 
and reducing the sentences of those who are incarcerated, may allow the 
correctional system to more adequately utilize its resources for the 
individuals in the system.367  Similarly, this proposal would reduce the 
collateral effects of long-term incarceration on children and families, which 
include reduced educational achievement and an increased likelihood of 
future criminal activity.368  From an incapacitation perspective, this proposal 
would shrink the pool of potential recruits for drug-trafficking organizations 
by opening doors that would otherwise remain closed.369 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States has a difficult task ahead; it has a strong interest in 
curbing the importation of drugs, but current methods are ineffective and 
costly.  Low-level drug couriers face disproportionately harsh punishments, 
while the leaders of drug-trafficking organizations remain insulated from and 
largely untouched by law enforcement.  In order to achieve real reform that 
effectively thwarts the inflow of drugs into the United States, policies should 
seek to address the underlying circumstances that make individuals 
vulnerable to recruitment as drug couriers.  Doing so would likely reduce the 
supply of willing and able drug couriers, thus making it more expensive for 
drug-trafficking organizations to import their product.  One solution may be 
to increase investment in communities disproportionally affected by the drug 
trade.  It may also involve addressing wealth disparities and increasing 
educational and employment opportunities, especially for women.370  One 
notable challenge would involve overcoming the deeply entrenched gender 
norms that relegate women to subordinate roles and make them particularly 
prone to recruitment by drug-trafficking organizations, both within the 
United States and abroad.  While there are many practical obstacles to 
overcome, and real reform would likely take decades, such challenges should 
not deter these large-scale transformative efforts. 
It is also prudent, however, to enact more immediate and more easily 
achievable reforms to address some of the injustices perpetuated by current 
policies.  This Note proposes a solution that would do just that.  By drafting 
a legislative amendment to identify low-level drug couriers and charge them 
under a separate misdemeanor statute, Congress could significantly 
ameliorate the harms suffered by both individual offenders and society at 
large as a result of the current ineffectual—and discriminatory—laws. 
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